Mr. Chairman,
On behalf of the State Signatories of the Group of 77 and China, I am
pleased to see you chairing the 24th Session of Working Group B. I believe
that under your able chairmanship and guidance, discussions will lead to
fruitful conclusions and I assure you of our full support and cooperation.
The Group of 77 and China extends its deepest condolences and
sympathy to the governments and peoples of the countries of Southeast and
South Asia and Africa devastated by the Indian Ocean tsunami of 26
December 2004. The Group also would like to express deep sympathy with all
other States whose nationals were lost in this disaster. The Group of 77
and China pays tribute to the governments and peoples around the world
whose generosity and assistance saw beyond national boundaries.
The Group of 77 and China welcomes the discussion of civil and
scientific applications of the CTBT verification technologies regarding
natural disasters. The devastation caused by the tsunami of December 2004
underlines the urgency of the Entry into Force of the Treaty, in order to
allow for the dissemination of information to the appropriate authorities
that may save innumerable lives in the future. The Group of G-77 and China
once again calls upon all countries that have not done so to sign and
ratify the Treaty.
The Group of 77 and China wishes to thank Executive Secretary
Wolfgang Hoffmann, not only for his comprehensive written and oral
reports, but also for his service with the CTBTO Preparatory Commission
since its inception. We appreciate the ongoing efforts of the Provisional
Technical Secretariat (PTS) in implementing the mandate of the CTBTO
PrepCom for the establishment of the international verification system at
the Entry Into Force (EIF) of the Treaty, in conformity with the treaty
provisions and PrepCom decisions.
Mr. Chairman,
The Group would like to express its views on the following issues to
be considered during this session:
In considering the guidance to the PTS for preparing the
verification-related work programme and budget elements for 2006, the
Group of 77 and China would like to reiterate that any proposal for the
verification-related work programme and budget elements for 2006 be guided
by the principles that the Group of 77 and China has stated on previous
occasions. Accordingly, the Group urges Working Group B to adjust the pace
of its work and requests the PTS to prioritize and reallocate its
financial resources between the 7 Major Programmes without overall
programmatic increases.
Mr. Chairman,
The Group of 77 and China takes note of the progress in the review of
the organizational structure of the PTS and looks forward to the
recommendations of the External Review Team. We believe that preparing for
the effective implementation of the CTBT and for the first session of the
Conference of the States Parties are the main tasks of the PrepCom. These
tasks encompass political and technical aspects. In any attempt at
restructuring, the Entry Into Force of the Treaty remains the primary
objective. Therefore, the purpose of the restructuring of the PTS should
be to increase coordination, enhance efficiency and cost-effectiveness, in
pursuit of the Entry Into Force of the Treaty. To this end, the
experiences of the PTS should be duly considered. The G-77 and China
reiterates that recommendations for this sensitive issue can only be
implemented after they have been thoroughly reviewed in the Working Groups
and decided upon by the PrepCom.
The Group of 77 and China considers that, according to the resolution
establishing the PrepCom, technical testing and provisional operations
performed, as necessary, pending the Entry Into Force of the Treaty, are a
task of the PrepCom. We believe the operations of IMS stations before the
EIF of the Treaty are only for the purpose of evaluating the performance
and data quality of said stations, and are provisional in nature. The
legal and financial concerns of State Signatories should also be taken
into account in the negotiation of contracts for post certification
activities. We continue to support the position that testing should be
done on a strict timeframe.
The Group of 77 and China attaches great importance to the National
Data Centers (NDCs) and welcomes the role of the PTS in promoting the NDCs
of developing countries, especially with respect to the provision of
hardware and software. More training courses for NDCs are required to
provide the necessary capabilities for the States Signatories, especially
for developing countries, to take greater advantage of the data, products
and services of the IDC. The Group encourages wider participation of the
developing countries in NDC and IDC training courses.
The Group of 77 and China considers that the elements of the
verification regime of the treaty especially the IMS, IDC and OSI, are of
equal importance. Due to the complexity of the OSI issues, active
participation of all members is important. From our point of view the
elaboration of the draft OSI Operational Manual, based on the Initial
Draft Rolling Text (IDRT), remains a priority task for all members of the
Commission. We appreciate the efforts of the PTS in supporting the
elaboration of the draft On-Site Inspection (OSI) Operational Manual,
especially the contribution of the PTS in chapter 6 on inspection of
underground events, search logic, software checking, point of entry and
base camp activities. We ask for the continuation and increased
contribution of the PTS, based on the experience of workshops, tabletop
exercises and field experiments, to the discussion of the Draft OSI
Operational Manual.
From the point of view of the Group of 77 and China, the resources
allocated to the OSI programme should enable the necessary preparations
for the establishment of the OSI regime at Entry Into Force of the Treaty.
In accordance with the provisions of the Treaty, the text on the
establishment of the PrepCom and the development of the work of the PTS,
we note that information derived from the PTS, including IMS data and IDC
products are confidential. We believe that adopting a Confidentiality
Policy for the PTS is a real and urgent need. The confidentiality policy
should create a strict regime for handling all data and information
available to the PTS and should not be limited to the procedures of the
PTS in classification of the information. In this regard, we take note of
the paper of the PTS on its policies and procedures in handling the
sensitive information in document CTBT/PTS/INF.614. This document should
be further discussed. However, we believe that a comprehensive approach,
including definition of information, list of types of information
available to the PTS, criteria for the classification and
declassification, procedures and modalities for handling classified
information, changing the classification or designation of information,
roles and responsibilities of States Signatories, is necessary for the
confidentiality policy of the PTS.
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
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