Vienna Chapter
Mr. Chairman,
On behalf of State Signatories of the Group of 77 and China, I am
pleased to see you chairing the second part of the 23rd session of Working
Group B. I believe that under your chairmanship and guidance, discussions
will lead to fruitful conclusions and I assure you of our full
cooperation.
The Group wishes to thank the Executive Secretary, Ambassador
Wolfgang Hoffmann, for his comprehensive written and oral reports and we
would like to express our appreciation for the diligent efforts of the
whole PTS in implementing the mandates of the Preparatory Commission for
the establishment of the verification system at the Entry Into Force of
the Treaty. We note that since the beginning of 2004, additional progress
has been made in the establishment of the verification system, eleven more
stations have been certified, bringing the total number of facilities
certified to 94 (90 stations and 4 designated, radionuclide laboratories)
out of 337, training courses for the NDC were organized, IDC Software
integration work continued in the areas of software development,
maintenance and configuration management and the Eighth OSI Introductory
Course was conducted successfully and preparation for OSI major field
exercise to be conducted in 2007, has been initiated.
Since Mr Vladimir Kryuchenkov, OSI Director, disengaged from service
with the PTS on 12 July 2004 , The group would like to use this
opportunity and expresses its appreciations to the excellent job that has
been done by him. The group also welcomes Mr Boris Kvok new director of
OSI.
The Group would like to express its views on the following issues,
which will be considered during the present meeting of Working Group B.
1. In considering the guidance to the PTS for preparing programme and
budget for 2005, the Group would like to reiterate the views expressed in
its previous statements, in particular that any proposal for the programme
and budget for 2005 and thereafter, should be guided by the three main
principles of the G-77 which have been stated in previous occasions.
The Group takes note with appreciation of the efforts of the PTS for
the implementation of a realistic approach towards the program and budget
for 2005 and for trying to keep the 2005 at the same level as 2004 with no
programmatic increases over the 2003 funding level, or in PTS staffing
levels, and by sticking to the two assumptions of last year, namely no
programatic or staff increase and accommodation of proposed changes by
prioritization and reallocation of resources.
We also take note with appreciation of the adjustments to the 2005
programme and budget document (CTBT/PTS/INF.686), in which the PTS took
into account the guidance given by the Preparatory Commission and
describes the programme and budgetary adjustments proposed by the
Executive Secretary to the 2005 Programme and Budget Proposals: Initial
Draft (CTBT/PTS/INF.660). The Group welcomes the efforts of the PTS in
reallocating resources to provide for the costs for the second phase of
the System-Wide Performance Test (SPT1) and the estimated 2005 costs
related to the external review of the Organization, which is in keeping
with a ' zero real growth' budget. The Group also notes that the enhanced
security requirements, addressed in the section on 'Incremental
Programmatic Requirement: Security' are now incorporated in the request
for Major Programme 7 and remain the only real increase for 2005.
Mr. Chairman,
The Group would like to stress that the recommendations for enhancing
security measures should be decided by the State Signatories after
discussion in a transparent manner with the secretariats and with due
regards to cost efficiency and a realistic and practical approach based on
a real threat perception and on the local security situation. The Group
therefore welcomes any voluntary contribution and further consultations
between the PTS and other organizations as well as with the UN Secretariat
in New York. We expect that the State Signatories will be fully informed
about any developments in this regard.
We believe that there is still room for further cost efficiency in
the 2005 budget, in the following areas:
Funding for the Capital Investment Fund (CIF) may further decrease as
a lot of progress has already been made in the IMS Major Programme, and
the majority of stations have been site surveyed, installed and are being
certified and we are at the stage of organizational transition of the PTS
and its departure from station installation orientation.
We also believe that in the Post Certification Costs there is a
possibility for savings and cost efficiency, taking into account the
already approved guidelines in the WGB (CTBT/WGB-19/1 para 15) and WGA
(CTBT/WGA-22/1 para 15).
Mr. Chairman,
2. The Group attaches great importance to the National Data Centers
(NDCs) and welcomes the establishment and the work of the joint theme Task
of NDC in the framework of Working Group B and supports the main
objectives of this Task as articulated by its distinguished task leader.
We believe that the PTS should play a more active role in promoting the
NDCs of developing countries especially in providing hardware and
software. More training courses for NDCs are required to provide the
necessary capabilities for the States Signatories, especially for
developing countries, to take greater advantage of the data, products and
services of the IDC. In this regard we welcome the initiative of the PTS
to convene 3 regional training courses on the NDC data analysis for
regional groups of the G-77. The Group encourages wider participation of
the developing countries in NDC and IDC training courses.
3. The Group believes that according to the resolution on the
establishment of the Prep Com, technical testing and provisional
operations, as necessary, pending the Entry Into Force (EIF) of the
Treaty, are a task of the Prep Com. The operation of IMS stations before
the EIF of the Treaty is provisional and testing in nature and only for
the purpose of evaluating the performance and data quality of IMS
stations. The Group welcomes the adoption of the guidelines for technical
testing and provisional operation of certified IMS stations, the GCI and
the IDC in the 19 session of Working Group B [CTBT/PC-19/1/AnnexII, para
13]. We believe that the mode of operation of IMS certified stations
should be determined exclusively in the light of actual needs of testing
and maintenance of the IMS network. The legal and financial concerns of
State Signatories should also be duly taken into account during the
negotiation of contracts for post certification activities. We take note
of the decision of Working Group B in its 21st session, as stipulated in
para 10-12 of CTBT/WGB-21/1, on the proposed system-wide performance test.
We are of the view that this test should be carried out only when the
majority of the IMS stations, especially certified stations, are in place
and connected to the IDC and after enough preparation for this wide scale
test has been made by the PTS. The only purpose of this test is to
evaluate the performance of the whole system. We take note of the fact
that Working Group B in its 21st meeting (para 12 of CTBT/WGB-21/1) agreed
"the schedule for the phases of wide scale testing as well as their
duration should be flexible". However, we believe that the test
should be done in a very limited timeframe, taking into account the sole
purpose of testing the system. In the light of this position we believe
that option one of level of operation as reflected in document
CTBT/PTS/INF.664 could be a basis for further consideration subject to
reducing the monitoring level by PTS staff to normal working hours.
The Group also takes note of the initial report of the PTS on the
first, developmental preparatory phase of the IMS/GCI/IDC System-Wide
Performance Test (SPT1) in 2004 in document CTBT/PTS/INF.685 which
indicates that a total of 130 stations and four certified radionuclide
laboratories participated in the test.
4. The Group believes that all the elements of the verification
regime of the treaty including IMS, IDC and OSI, are important and in this
regard attaches great importance to a balanced approach dealing with all
those elements. Due to the complexity of the OSI issues, active
participation of all members is important. From our point of view the
elaboration of the draft OSI Operational Manual, based on the Initial
Draft Rolling Text (IDRT), remains a priority task for all members of the
Commission. We appreciate the efforts of the PTS in supporting the
elaboration of the draft On-Site Inspection (OSI) Operational Manual,
especially the contribution of the PTS in chapter 6 on inspection of
underground events, search logic, software checking, point of entry and
base camp activities.
The Group takes note of the Strategic Plan for the OSI Major
Programme (CTBT/PTS/INF.677). and the three strategic goals that have been
defined in order to achieve full OSI readiness by entry into force (EIF)
of the Treaty. We also note that preparation for FE07, a major field
exercise to be conducted in 2007, has been initiated.
The Group appreciates the efforts of the PTS in providing drafting
materials, advice and comments on highlighted issues and missing elements
in the IDRT that are of a technical and administrative nature, taking into
account the lessons learned from various OSI activities. We request the
continued and enhanced contribution of the PTS, based on the experience of
workshops, tabletop exercises and field experiments, to the discussion of
draft OSI Operational Manual. The group also notes with appreciation that
the Eighth OSI Introductory Course was conducted successfully from 26 to
30 April 2004 in Vienna (CTBT/PTS/INF.672) in which 44 trainees, including
PTS staff, from 32 States Signatories attended.
From our point of view, adequate resources should be allocated to the
OSI major program in order to enable the necessary preparations for the
establishment of the OSI regime at Entry Into Force of the Treaty. This
should include testing and evaluation of all OSI equipment, establishing
supporting infrastructures and preparing a comprehensive programme for
training of the inspectors and inspection assistants after the EIF of the
Treaty. We believe that the report which has been prepared by the External
Evaluation Team of the OSI (CTBT/WGB-21/INF.5), contains many important
recommendations for further improving the functionality and effectiveness
of the OSI Major Programme, so we would like to ask the WGB to discuss and
consider this report in full and with great care, as well as the response
of the PTS in this regard.
5. In accordance with the provisions of the Treaty, the text on the
establishment of the Prep Com and the development of the work of the PTS,
we believe that adopting a Confidentiality Policy for the PTS is a real
and urgent need. The confidentiality policy should create a strict regime
for handling all data and information available to the PTS and should not
be limited to the procedures of the PTS in classifying the information. In
this regard, we take note of document CTBT/PTS/INF.614/rev1, which
contains the PTS policies and procedures for handling sensitive
information. This document could be a basis for further discussion.
However, we believe that the confidentiality policy of the PTS should be
comprehensive and should include, i.e.,the definition of sensitive
information, list of types of information available to the PTS, criteria
for the classification and declassification, Procedures and Modalities for
handling classified information, changing Classification or Designation of
Information, roles and responsibilities of States Signatories. We believe
that more time should be allocated in WGB for discussion of that important
task.
Mr. Chairman,
6.Regarding the restructuring of the PTS the Group recalls that the
tasks of the PTS include two main pillars namely political issues and
technical issues. Therefore its our view that in any attempt at
restructuring, the balance between political and technical tasks of the
PTS should be maintained. We thus believe that in doing so, outreach
activities and the international cooperation sections should be
strengthened. The work of the verification sections should be defined
based on the provisional nature of the PTS, bearing in mind that there is
no verification work for the system before the EIF of the Treaty. The
purposes of the restructuring should be only to increase coordination, to
enhance efficiency and possible cost efficiency in the PTS. The
experiences of the PTS should be taken into account. The whole process of
restructuring should be fully transparent and in close consultation with
the States Signatories. We reiterate that this issue is very sensitive and
that the recommendations of the external Team can be implemented only
after a thorough review by the States Signatories is undertaken, the
corresponding recommendations are made by the WGs and the appropriate
decisions are taken by the Prep-Com.
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
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